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Abstract—Debuggers are a popular reverse engineering and
tampering tool. Self-debugging is an effective technique for
applications to defend themselves against hostile debuggers.
In penetration tests on state-of-the-art self-debugging, we
observed several opportunities through which it could be
attacked, however. We therefore improved upon the existing
technique, making it more resilient by introducing reciprocal
debugging and making the transfers of control between
protected application and self-debugger more stealthy. This
paper presents the improved self-debugging design, and de-
tails our research efforts into realizing reciprocal debugging.
In our evaluation we show that the improved design is
significantly harder for attackers to defeat.
Index Terms—reverse engineering, software protection, anti-
tampering, anti-debugging, self-debugging
1. Introduction
Debuggers are a popular tool in the toolbox of so-
called man-at-the-end (MATE) attackers [1]. These at-
tackers try to gain unauthorized access to confidential
assets in software by reverse engineering the software
and try to tamper with the integrity of software assets by
manipulating them, e.g., to work around license checks or
copy protections. Debuggers offer a convenient, interac-
tive, scriptable, and flexible interface to inspect and tamper
with the evolving internal state of a running program.
Those same attacker goals can be reached with many
other means available to MATE attackers that have white-
box access to the software and the systems on which they
attack it in their labs. However, alternative tools such as
emulators, instrumentation tools, and hypervisors lack the
convenience of debuggers for many concrete actions that
attackers want to perform. Preventing the use of debuggers
can hence slow down MATE attackers, and force them
to invest more effort and hence more money into their
attacks. As the major objective of software protection is
to change a MATE attack’s (perceived) balance between
required attack investment and resulting profit [2], [3],
techniques that prevent the use of hostile debuggers can
hence be a worthwhile defensive investments.
One class of anti-debugging techniques has the appli-
cation query the environment (e.g., via standard library
APIs or system calls) for signs they are being debugged
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or not [1], [4], [5]. However, as debuggers can intercept
those queries, they are easy to work around. For popular
debuggers such as OllyDbg, a range of plugins exist to
defeat such simple anti-debugging techniques [6]–[8].
A stronger form of anti-debugging is by means of
self-debugging [9], [10]. The application then contains its
own so-called self-debugger and spawns its own debug-
ging process, which attaches itself to the application as a
debugger soon as it is launched. As all major OSs only
support one debugger process per debuggee [11]–[13],
the application-friendly self-debugger occupies the only
seat available, such that a hostile debugger can no longer
be attached. The self-debugger is application-friendly, in
the sense that it does not contain the traditional debugger
functionality that can be used to attack the application.
To prevent an attacker detaching the self-debugger
to free the seat for their own hostile debugger, we pre-
viously proposed to migrate critical functionality from
the application to the self-debugger [14]. Through source
code annotations, a developer can designate the code to
be migrated. During execution, at certain program points
control is transferred from the protected application to
the self-debugger. The latter subsequently executes the
migrated (and transformed) fragments, and passes con-
trol back to the application. Simply detaching the self-
debugger then breaks the program. Consequently, attack-
ing a self-debugging program to re-enable the use of a
debugger requires much more work from the attacker,
such as migrating the necessary functionality back into
the application (or into the dynamically linked library,
which we can protect as well). The usefulness of such anti-
debugging is apparent from the fact that our approach is
deployed in millions of devices protected by Nagravision,
the company to which we transferred our technology.
Still, attackers have some opportunities to attack the
self-debugging protection. In a public challenge and in
professional penetration testing experiments [15], we ob-
served two critical aspects. First and foremost, if an at-
tacker can still debug the self-debugger, they can observe
the migrated functionality and the control transfers. This
can help them to work around the protection by undoing
it or by circumventing it in some way. Secondly, when
the code fragments implementing the transitions and the
interface to pass data between the application and the
self-debugger lack stealth, attackers can use relatively
simple static techniques such as pattern matching to iden-
tify them, easing the implementation of (semi-)automated
workarounds. We observed both attacks in the aforemen-
tioned penetration testing experiments.
To counter those activities, we studied extensions in
two directions: more stealthy control flow transfers that
are also more resilient to workarounds on the one hand,
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and reciprocal debugging on the other hand, because when
both the protected application and the self-debugger debug
each other, an attacker can debug neither of them.
This paper reports our findings. Both for making con-
trol transfers more stealthy and resilient, and for making
self-debugging reciprocal, we report opportunities and
obstacles as present on popular architectures and operating
systems. We make the following contributions:
• We present an improved design of our self-
debugging technique, featuring reciprocal debug-
ging and stealthier interfaces.
• We describe a working reciprocal debugging im-
plementation, and explain the deadlocks inherent
in such a system and how to handle them.
• We examine portable methods through which a
debugger can be stealthily signaled.
• We provide a security evaluation of our improved
design, using Binary Ninja.
• We provide an open-source prototype implemen-
tation of our design, to be released at a later date.
2. Self-Debugging Security Analysis
MATE attackers want to analyze or tamper with the
sensitive assets contained in a target application, and can
be assumed to have total control over the environment
this application runs in [16]. This means they can run the
application in an emulated environment, disable security
features provided by the OS such as ASLR, as well as use
many other different tools at their disposal to analyze or
tamper with an application statically or dynamically. De-
buggers are powerful dynamic tools, providing attackers
with the capabilities to gather traces, dump cryptographic
keys, or even execute code fragments out of context, e.g.,
to work around copy protections.
All major OSs only provide support for a single de-
bugger per application [11]–[13]. Self-debugging takes ad-
vantage of this limitation by occupying the only available
debugger seat with a custom, application-friendly self-
debugger [14]. This protection prevents attackers from
attaching their own, hostile debugger to the application,
and consequently first has to be defeated by any attackers
before they can debug the application. The protection has
thus become the target, and we therefore investigate how
it can be attacked as well as defended.
We start with an overview of our original design, and
then explore the different ways in which it can be attacked.
2.1. Self-Debugging Overview
Figure 1 illustrates the design of the original self-
debugging technique [14]. Whereas the original, unpro-
tected application as shown on the left consists of a single
process, the protected self-debugging application, which
was generated by means of binary rewriting, consists of
two processes. The first process is the protected applica-
tion, which still contains the main part of the application
code, largely unchanged. The second process is the self-
debugger, which provides the protection to the application
by “debugging” it. In the context of this paper, this means
“attaching to the application like a debugger does”, it does
not include the act of using debugger functionality to find
bugs. The self-debugger contains a mini-debugger com-
ponent that implements the necessary debugger interface
functionality using ptrace, the standard debugging API
on Linux [11]. Next to that it also contains a number
of code fragments migrated from the application context,
guided by source code annotations. These fragments get
invoked by the protected application whenever they need
to be executed, but they will be executed in the self-
debugger’s context. It is this mechanism that creates a
dependence between the protected application and the
self-debugger. This dependence prevents the execution of
the application when the self-debugger is not attached, and
thus keeps an attacker from detaching the self-debugger
and attaching their own hostile debugger instead.
The initialization of the self-debugging technique is
provided by an initialization routine that is injected into
to the binary. This routine is invoked whenever the binary
is loaded, both in case the binary is an executable file
with which a process is launched and in case it is a
dynamically linked library loaded into an existing pro-
cess. The routine performs a fork [17], with the parent
becoming—or rather, staying—the protected application,
and the child becoming the self-debugger that attaches to
the application. The application thread that invokes the
initialization routine is kept waiting and only allowed to
continue after the self-debugger has finished attaching to
all of the protected application’s threads. There is also an
accompanying finalization routine.
At run time, the protected application needs to execute
migrated code fragments. The red edges in Figure 1 show
the flow of control to invoke and execute such a fragment
in the self-debugger. The application contains exception-
inducing instructions at every location a fragment is to be
invoked. In our original implementation, these exception-
inducing instructions are hard-coded breakpoint (BKPT)
instructions preceded by instructions that push an identi-
fier onto the stack. When they get executed an exception
occurs that generates a signal. The kernel then stops
the protected application until its debugger investigates
the signal and allows the application to continue. The
exception thus switches control flow to the self-debugger,
and more specifically to its mini-debugger component,
which derives the requested code fragment from the iden-
tifier on the stack: It uses this identifier to look up the
associated fragment’s address in a mapping table, and then
transfers control to that address. The migrated fragment
subsequently executes in the self-debugger context, but
performs reads and writes to the protected application’s
address space when required, using the mini-debugger’s
memory support. Upon return from the fragment, the
mini-debugger updates changed registers in the application
process, and finally allows it to continue executing. The
mini-debugger itself then continues in its debugger loop,
awaiting further requests by the application.
2.2. Defeating Self-Debugging
To attach their own hostile debugger functionality to
the protected application to observe or manipulate its
execution, attackers first have to defeat the self-debugger.
They can achieve this in a number of ways. We present
these attacks in two broad categories: those where the self-
debugger is detached, and those where it is still attached.
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Figure 1. Overview of the original self-debugging protection
In the first category a hostile debugger can be attached di-
rectly to the protected application. In the second category,
the hostile debugger cannot be attached directly.
2.2.1. With the Self-Debugger Detached. Detaching the
self-debugger is not hard by itself. It can be done, e.g.,
by killing the self-debugger, or by removing or disabling
the initialization routine that spawns it. This by itself does
not suffice, however, because the protection also includes
the migration of code fragments into the self-debugger.
As the protected application at times needs to execute
these code fragments, it will stop working when the self-
debugger is detached. Attackers thus need to deal with
these migrated code fragments. They can do so in several
ways: The migration transformations can be reversed, the
execution of fragments can be avoided, and they can be
emulated in an attacker-controlled process.
Reversing the transformations means both undoing
the changes to the migrated code fragments so they can
execute directly in the application again, and reversing
the control flow switches to the mini-debugger back to
normal control flow that does not depend on a debugger.
To reverse transformations in general, attackers first need
to find out which transformations have been applied and
where, after which they can tamper with the binary to
undo the protection. For self-debugging, attackers need to
locate the control flow switches and the migrated code
fragments. Simple static analysis suffices to do so: one
can directly find the hard-coded breakpoints by simply
scanning the binary, and one can find their intended targets
by using the accompanying identifier to look up the target
address in the mapping table. Alternatively, dynamic anal-
ysis such as tracing the self-debugger’s execution can also
be used to determine the intended targets of the control
flow switches. Such an analysis can be achieved easily by
attaching a hostile debugger to the self-debugger process.
In the public challenge of the ASPIRE FP7 project, the
self-debugging protection was reversed manually by an
amateur hacker in this way [15], [16]. With the necessary
effort, attackers could automate these analysis steps, as
well as the subsequent tampering.
Alternatively, attackers might be interested in tracing
or tampering with only a small part of the application, in
which case reversing all the transformations for all of the
migrated code fragments is typically not necessary. The
attackers can instead try to invoke execution paths that
enable them to reach their specific goals, yet contain no (or
few) migrated code fragments. Using a debugger to alter
the flow of execution at will—perhaps even in a scripted
manner—is of great benefit in constructing such paths.
Moreover, when the code to be protected is a dynamically
linked library, attackers can invoke exposed API functions
in the order of their choosing. This attack approach was
employed by professional penetration testers during the
ASPIRE FP7 project’s security evaluation [15], [16]. The
same analyses as used for reversing transformations are
required, as well as the extra path analysis.
A last attack option is to leave all transformations
intact, and to emulate the mini-debugger function. This
emulation comes down to switching control flow to the
right migrated code fragments when requested, and cre-
ating the right context for them to execute. One way
to do so is to create and attach a hostile debugger that
contains the necessary emulation functionality next to the
traditional debugging functionality one expects to find in
any typical debugger. The migrated code fragments can
then be executed in this hostile debugger’s context, while
it can use its privileges to tamper with and trace the
protected application at will. Another option would be to
insert some kind of signal handler that can resolve the
control flow switches into the application itself. In that
scenario, however, the migrated code fragments would run
memory support
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Figure 2. Overview of the improved self-debugging protection featuring reciprocal debugging and stealthier interfaces
directly in the target’s address space. As the fragments
were transformed to run in another address space, some
hooking of the ptrace API would be required for these
fragments to execute correctly.
2.2.2. With the Self-Debugger Attached. Here, attack-
ers cannot attach their own debugger to observe or to
tamper directly with the protected application. However,
they can target the self-debugger itself, or gain debugging
privileges through some other way than the ptrace
API. During the ASPIRE Security Evaluation professional
penetration testers tried and failed to use multiple tools for
tracing or live-debugging a protected application [15].
Attackers can attach their debugger directly to the self-
debugger, and use its privileges to subvert the protection,
effectively turning the self-debugger into their own hos-
tile debugger. By debugging the self-debugger they have
direct access to the migrated code fragments during their
execution. More importantly, they can also gain indirect
access to the protected application by taking advantage
of the self-debugger’s privileges and injecting ptrace
requests. This allows them to trace and tamper with the
application, without directly debugging it or interfering
in its workings. Such an approach would require little
analysis, yet bypass the protection completely.
Alternatively, debugging-like powers can also be
achieved without using the ptrace API. Program em-
ulation using Valgrind [18], or QEMU [19] can provide
tracing, as long as the ptrace API and the entire work-
ings of the control flow switches are correctly emulated.
Using Valgrind, interactive debugging can even be pro-
vided through a gdbserver. We tried attacking our original
implementation using this approach, but did not succeed
because of incorrect emulation of the ptrace API and
the exception-inducing instructions [14]. Implementing a
correct emulation of these aspects is just engineering,
however. We therefore consider it worthwhile to defend
the application against being executed in an emulated
environment. Many such defenses already exist, and are
orthogonal to our technique [20]. We thus consider anti-
emulation out of scope for this paper.
Finally, attackers could modify the OS in order to
provide them an alternative to the ptrace API. This
would come at the cost of considerable engineering effort,
however. To be useful to attackers, such an API has to pro-
vide the functionality necessary for interactive debugging
or performing scripted attacks.
3. Resilient Self-Debugging Design
To counter the above attacks, our improved self-
debugging technique features two improvements: a tighter,
reciprocal coupling between the application process and
its self-debugger process, and stealthier interfaces for in-
voking the mini-debugger. Figure 2 contains an overview
of the design. We discuss many aspects below.
3.1. Reciprocal Coupling
The self-debugger can be a target for attackers, who
either want to debug it or run the protected application
without it being attached. We therefore explored methods
of making the coupling between the two tighter, that is,
making it harder for an attacker to kill, detach, or sub-
vert the self-debugger without triggering a reaction. More
specifically, we explored reciprocal debugging, where not
only does the self-debugger “debug” the application, but
the application itself also “debugs” the self-debugger. This
keeps any hostile debuggers from attaching to either.
Figure 2 presents an overview of reciprocal debugging,
together with the changes to the original design it requires
in terms of components and the flow of control. These
changes serve to ensure that the protected application
remains attached to the self-debugger. In the original
design, the protected application could raise exceptions to
invoke the mini-debugger. In the improved design, such
invocations can happen in two directions. Consequently,
both processes contain an identical mini-debugger.
With two mini-debuggers present and the accompa-
nying bidirectional mini-debugger invocations, the inter-
actions between the protected application and the self-
debugger are more complex. We start with an abstract
overview of these interactions, and follow up by illustrat-
ing the control flow portrayed in Figure 2 as a concrete
example. At any time during the execution of application
code, either the protected application or the self-debugger
is functioning as the exception-throwing process, with the
other process functioning as the exception-catching pro-
cess. The exception-throwing process executes (possibly
migrated) application code, until it throws an exception
to invoke the mini-debugger. The exception-catching pro-
cess, on the other hand, executes in the debugger loop of
its mini-debugger, awaiting any invocations. We consider
the exception-catching process to contain an active mini-
debugger. When an exception is thrown by the exception-
throwing process, this process is stopped, and the active
mini-debugger in the exception-catching process is in-
voked. At this point, the roles of the two processes have
to switch. The exception-catching process will transfer
control to application code and become the exception-
throwing process. Conversely, the exception-throwing pro-
cess will ready itself for invocations by activating its
mini-debugger, and thus become the exception-catching
process. These transitions are managed by the active mini-
debugger in the exception-catching process. It first uses its
debugger privileges to intervene in the stopped exception-
throwing process, transitioning it to an exception-catching
process. More precisely, the active mini-debugger ma-
nipulates the state and context of the exception-throwing
process and then resumes it in the debugger loop, thereby
activating its mini-debugger. After this transition, the ac-
tive, invoked mini-debugger can complete the role switch
by transferring control to the requested application code,
thereby deactivating itself and transitioning its process
from exception-catching to exception-throwing.
We present the control flow depicted by the alpha-
betically ordered red edges in Figure 2) as a concrete
example. Here, the protected application is the exception-
throwing process, executing application code; the self-
debugger is the exception-catching process, with an active
mini-debugger. The protected application throws an excep-
tion ( a ), which invokes the active mini-debugger running
in the self-debugger ( b ). First, the active mini-debugger
transitions the protected application to an exception-
catching process by activating its mini-debugger ( c ).
Secondly, the active mini-debugger transitions the self-
debugger to an exception-throwing process by transferring
control to application code, in the form of a migrated code
fragment ( d ). This migrated code might perform memory
operations, requiring the memory support of the mini-
debugger ( e and f ). At some point the migrated code
in the self-debugger throws an exception ( g ), invoking
the active mini-debugger running in the protected appli-
cation ( h ). This active mini-debugger also manages two
transitions: First, of the self-debugger into an exception-
catching process ( i ); Second, of the protected application
into an exception-throwing process, by transferring control
to application code ( j ).
As an additional protective measure, the protected
application and self-debugger attach to each other with
the PTRACE_O_EXITKILL option enabled. This option
ensures that a debugged process can never escape its
debugger’s control, even if the debugger unexpectedly
exits. The kernel enforces this by immediately shutting
down the debuggee when a debugger exits. If the debugger
simply detaches, however, the debuggee is allowed to
continue normally. In the case of reciprocal debugging,
enabling this option ensures an attacker can kill neither
the protected application nor the self-debugger, without
the other immediately shutting down.
If the entirety of its initialization happens correctly,
this design is impervious to dynamic tampering through
a debugger. Once the initialization is done, the protected
application can no longer be debugged, the self-debugger
cannot be debugged, and even killing the self-debugger
will not help an attacker.
3.2. Stealthier Interfaces
Regardless of the specific attack, analyzing how the
mini-debugger is invoked and to which (migrated) ap-
plication code it transfers control helps the attacker in
understanding the application. In our original design, the
interfaces between the protected application and mini-
debugger were implemented with manifest idioms (i.e.,
breakpoint instructions and IDs pushed onto the stack),
and the control flow between them was hence easy to
follow, e.g., in a static analysis that is customized to
handle the idioms. To inhibit analysis, we extended the
mini-debugger with stealthier interfaces.
This interface consists of two aspects, as the
exception-throwing process (1) needs to invoke the mini-
debugger in the exception-catching process by raising a
signal, and (2) needs to pass the necessary information
to identify the target code to be executed once control is
transferred. Whereas our original design only allowed for
a single implementation of both aspects, we explored and
implemented several stealthier, alternative methods in our
improved design for both of them.
Moreover, the identification of target code fragments
is also more flexible in the new design, as control can now
be passed to any code fragment in the exception-catching
process, whichever of the two processes is the exception-
catching one at some point in time. In the original design
by contrast, control could only be passed to the set of mi-
grated code fragments. Because the identification of target
code is more flexible, the interface through which both the
mini-debuggers in both the processes are invoked can be
exactly the same for invocations in both directions of the
reciprocal design. This is a useful feature for two reasons.
First, one mini-debugger implementation then suffices for
both processes, so only one mini-debugger needs to be
injected into the protected binary. Secondly, having the
same interface in both directions implies that the static
code fragments making invocations do not reveal which
mini-debugger they invoke by means of their appearance
alone. This reduces the amount of useful information that
attackers can extract from the protected binary through
simple static attacks such as pattern matching.
3.2.1. Signaling the Mini-Debugger. We replaced the
conspicuous BKPT instructions of our original design with
injected code that looks harmless and similar to the sur-
rounding code, yet intentionally generates software faults.
Whereas originally a SIGTRAP signal was generated
and examined by the mini-debugger, our new design can
handle a mix of different signals such as SIGSEGV and
SIGFPE. Examples of injected code signaling the mini-
debugger from both the application and self-debugger pro-
cesses can be observed in Figure 2 ( a and g ). Here, ADR
is an ARM assembler macro-instruction that produces an
address in a register. The values OBF1, OBF2, and OBF3
produced by the ADR instructions are addresses that cause
segmentation faults when accessed, either because they
are invalid or because more permissions are required. We
thus have some faulting instructions (LDR, BX, and STR
in Figure 2), preceded by some other instruction(s) that
set up the fault (the ADR instructions in Figure 2).
Figure 2 depicts the injection of both the instructions
that set the registers to set up the fault and the faulting
instruction itself, such that they directly follow each other.
Our implementation has more complex features to inhibit
analyses. Instead of injecting faulting instructions, it can
reuse instructions already present in the application. It
then injects instructions that set up the registers for the
software fault and add a jump to an already existing
fragment that ends with an exception-causing instruction
(e.g., a BX or a STR) when executed on the set register
contents. This reuse makes the attacker’s analyses harder
as some instructions originally executed in only one con-
text (the original application) are now executed in multiple
contexts, i.e., both as parts of the original application code
and to generate faults. It also splits the code that generates
the software fault from the code that actually wants to
invoke the mini-debugger, separating them in space. It
even separates the software fault and its set-up in time
when the jumped-to fragment contains instructions before
the faulting instruction. Proper care then has to be taken
that the intervening instructions do not change any live
registers or have other side effects, of course.
By using less conspicuous code for signaling, however,
it also becomes harder for the mini-debugger to distin-
guish between “forged” signals that request the switch
to application code, and signals generated by genuine
software faults. Causes of such signals can be bugs in
the application, but also intentional functionality, such as
processor feature detection, i.e., testing whether a certain
instruction is supported by the hardware. Consequently, it
is necessary for the mini-debugger to correctly make this
distinction, and it thus contains a mechanism that allows
for the verification of requested switches.
3.2.2. Target Identification. There are two aspects of
target identification to consider: the location in which
to pass the information about the target, and the way
in which this information encodes the identity of the
target. In our original design, both of these aspects were
problematic with respect to stealthiness and ease of reverse
engineering. First, the mapping table used for converting
identifiers into addresses was a single centralized and
unobfuscated table of all the addresses of migrated code
fragments. A reverse engineer could thus, upon finding
this table, find all control flow targets and start analyzing
them. Secondly, in our original design the identifier was
passed in a fixed place—the top of the stack—by the
instruction immediately preceding the trap.
In our improved design, we take a decentralized ap-
proach: rather than passing an identifier that needs to be
linked to a target somehow, we now pass the address of the
requested target itself, in an obfuscated form. This way,
there is no single table that can be abused by attackers
to find all control flow targets. Moreover, the obfuscated
address is no longer passed in a fixed location, but in a
variable location that is implicated in the software fault
used to signal the mini-debugger. This approach can be
observed in Figure 2. In one instance, the code fragment
in the self-debugger signals the mini-debugger by jumping
to the address OBF2 ( g ), for which the execution mem-
ory permission is lacking. The mini-debugger finds this
obfuscated address OBF2 by inspecting the software fault,
and then decodes it into the target address to be invoked.
Another example would be a a software fault caused by a
division by zero, where the obfuscated address could be
stored in the register that was used as the numerator.
In our current proof-of-concept implementation we
deploy only a few methods to obfuscate the target ad-
dresses. This could easily be extended to using a myriad of
data obfuscation methods. For every invocation the mini-
debugger would then employ a decision tree to determine
the specific method to decode the obfuscated address.
The variables used in the decision tree could include the
signaling method, the values in fixed or method-dependent
memory addresses or registers, etc.
4. Implementation Challenges and Solutions
This section discusses noteworthy aspects of our
implementation that featured significant research chal-
lenges. In the process of exploring a more capa-
ble mini-debugger, we came to rely on more recent
ptrace functionality such as PTRACE_SEIZE and
PTRACE_O_EXITKILL [11]. These features are only
present as of Linux 3.4 and 3.8, respectively. Our binary
rewriter operates on ARMv7 binary code.
4.1. Reciprocal Debugging without Deadlocks
A system of two processes that debug each other and
communicate via signals is fragile and prone to deadlocks.
To make it work correctly took significant research efforts.
When a signal other than SIGKILL arrives at a de-
buggee process, the kernel places this process in a stopped
state [11]. The debugger is notified of the signal, handles
it (however it chooses to do so), and decides whether or
not it is to be delivered to the debuggee. The debugger can
thus choose to suppress signals, which in effect the mini-
debugger does when handling a request to transfer control
to some application code. After the debugger is done
handling the signal, it allows the debuggee to continue
(with or without actual delivery of the signal). In essence,
when a signal arrives at a debuggee process, it is stopped,
and can only continue after its debugger allows it to.
In the context of reciprocal debugging, this can become
a problem. When signals arrive at both the protected
application and the self-debugger simultaneously or close
together, both processes end up in a stopped state, each
waiting until the other one allows it to continue.
Conceptually, avoiding such deadlocks is simple:
One can prevent signals arriving close together to both
processes by preventing signals from arriving at the
exception-catching process altogether. That process will
then at all times be available to handle the signals arriving
at the exception-throwing process. This is easier said than
done, however. Avoiding deadlocks requires recognizing
all possible sources of signals, and implementing methods
to handle these cases. We describe several specific sources
of signals, the associated deadlocks, and the solutions. We
conclude by discussing the remaining possible deadlocks.
4.1.1. Child Processes. When something happens to a
child process of potential interest to the parent process—
such as the child process stopping or exiting—, the kernel
by default sends a SIGCHLD signal to that parent [21].
In addition, the kernel always treats a debugger process
as a parent process of the debuggee [11], so whenever a
debuggee changes state, its debugger is notified through
a SIGCHLD signal. In our case, any state change in any
of the two processes results in a SIGCHLD signal being
sent to the other process. When the exception-throwing
process invokes the active mini-debugger, this could cause
a deadlock. Without precautions, the exception-throwing
process is placed in a stopped state by the kernel,
which simultaneously sends a SIGCHLD signal to the
exception-catching process, which will be blocked until
the exception-throwing process allows it to continue. This
is precisely the sort of situation we need to avoid.
To do so, we let both the application and the self-
debugger process make use of the sigaction API [22]
to disable the default sending of SIGCHLD signals by the
kernel upon state changes in their child processes.
For applications where receiving and handling such
signals from other child processes is part of the ap-
plication’s correct functioning, simply disabling the sig-
nals is not an option. An alternative solution, which
we have not implemented yet but only requires some
engineering, is then to keep these signals pending using
the sigprocmask API [23], and only handle them at
specified synchronization moments, when it is certain the
self-debugger’s process state will not change.
There is one exception to the ignoring of SIGCHLD
signals: When a debugged process exits, the kernel always
sends one, which cannot be disabled. However, before
a debugged process is allowed to exit, its debugger is
notified of the impending departure. The debugger can
use this opportunity to detach from the exiting process,
forestalling the arrival of the SIGCHLD signal. We hence
solved this exception by making the self-debugger detach
from the protected application in the appropriate places.
4.1.2. Users and IPC. A user or process can send any
kind of signal directly at a process using the kill
command or API, provided that they possess the required
privileges [24]. Such signals might be used to request that
the application output a status update, or in the context
of inter-process communication (IPC). While we might
question the motives of a human user simultaneously
sending a signal to both the protected application and the
self-debugger, there is at least one system process that has
a good motive. When a system shutdown is requested,
the system daemon—be it sysvinit, systemd, or
something else—handles this by sending a SIGTERM
signal to all running processes at the same time [25].
Most processes will then terminate, and any process that
has not yet done so after a specified delay will be sent
an additional SIGKILL, immediately terminating it. For
reciprocal debugging, the initial SIGTERM causes a dead-
lock that not even the subsequent SIGKILL can solve.
Using the aforementioned sigaction API does not
suffice now: When a debuggee process asks not to be
notified of signals from a specific type, the kernel still
informs its debugger [11], [22], which then first needs to
intervene. In our case, we hence still have a deadlock. A
working alternative is blocking the sending of signals of
a certain type with the sigprocmask API [23]. Those
signal are then kept pending until the type is unblocked
again. For a debugged process, only when the signal is
unblocked again will the debugger be notified of its arrival.
Whenever a mini-debugger becomes the active one,
it therefore blocks all possible signal types except
for SIGKILL and SIGSTOP, which we discuss later.
This blocking is undone right before deactivating and
transferring control to application code. The exception-
catching process thus blocks all possible signals, while the
exception-throwing process maintains its original behav-
ior. This maintains behavior that depends on signals sent
by other processes or users. The previously discussed case
of a system shutdown serves as an example. There, the
exception-throwing and the exception-catching processes
simultaneously receive a SIGTERM signal. The signal ar-
riving at the exception-catching process is simply blocked.
The signal arriving at the exception-throwing process is
first presented to the exception-catching process, which
sends it on to the former. The application then shuts down
in a proper manner, cleaning up properly before exiting.
4.1.3. Software Faults. The aforementioned solutions
only block signals that were sent to it through kill or
one of its variants. A signal caused by a software fault
inside the process itself cannot be blocked that way, and
has to be handled before the process can continue.
Faults inside the exception-throwing process can be in-
tentional, i.e., injected by us to invoke the mini-debugger,
or genuine faults, possibly caused by bugs or, e.g., by code
testing the processor’s support for certain instruction set
extensions. In Section 4.3, we describe an optional mech-
anism to distinguish between these cases and to pass any
genuine signal on to exception-throwing process. It is thus
no problem if that process generates a genuine software
fault. On the other hand, if the exception-catching process
generates such a fault, a deadlock is certain to follow. A
software fault generated in the exception-catching process
can only be the result of a bug in the mini-debugger, so
with proper engineering this becomes a non-issue.
4.1.4. Remaining Deadlocks. An important caveat to
the above is that neither SIGKILL nor SIGSTOP can
be ignored or blocked, as described in Section 4.1.2.
If a SIGKILL arrives at either process, it simply
dies, taking the other process with it because of the
PTRACE_O_EXITKILL option. This is not a problem,
it is exactly what we want. If a SIGSTOP arrives at the
exception-catching process, a deadlock does still occur,
as the exception-throwing process is running application
code instead of paying attention to its debuggee. This
means that no SIGSTOP should ever be sent to the
protected application or the self-debugger, as either could
be the exception-catching process at any moment.
This is certainly a limitation, but is not necessarily an
important one for the specific applications we want to pro-
tect. On the one hand, an application sending a SIGSTOP
signal to stop itself or one of its component processes can
be adapted to send a SIGTSTP signal instead. Contrary
to a SIGSTOP, a SIGTSTP can be blocked. Although the
resulting process stop might be delayed, no deadlock will
occur. On the other hand, SIGSTOP signals originating
outside of the application are entirely out of our control.
Such signals are of use to potential attackers that want to
to tamper with the application, however, and the resulting
deadlock could hence be seen as extra protection.
4.2. Signaling the Mini-Debugger
We use intentional processor faults to signal the
mini-debugger. Such faults can be generated in various
ways, but ultimately result in just four different signals:
SIGILL, SIGFPE, SIGSEGV, and SIGBUS. Popov et
al. used such intentional faults for static control flow
obfuscation [26]. Our context differs in two ways. First,
whereas they aim to thwart disassembly, we aim to thwart
hostile debuggers. Second, we use the ARMv7 architec-
ture, which is used on a variety of platforms with many
optional features. Portability is thus a major concern. We
investigated the portability of various signaling methods
for the ARMv7 architecture, and also compared with x86
(or x86-64) architectures to provide a broader scope.
4.2.1. Illegal Instructions. Not all ARM or x86 proces-
sors implement all extensions of their respective instruc-
tion set architectures (ISAs). Moreover, in both ISAs many
combinations of bits do not encode an actual instruction.
For any processor, unsupported encodings are illegal in-
structions, and attempting to execute them results in a
fault. On Linux, such a fault generates a SIGILL signal.
Inserting an illegal instruction encoding is not future-
proof, however, as future ISA revisions could redefine
such encodings. Unimplemented instructions differ be-
tween processors, and are hence not portable. Further-
more, instances are easy to identify using a disassembler.
4.2.2. Division by Zero. A less conspicuous approach
uses instructions that only fault under some conditions,
but otherwise execute normally. A good example are
divisions, which only fault for division by zero. Using
data obfuscation techniques, loading a zero into the de-
nominator register can remain hidden from static analysis.
Divisions by zero are not portable, however. In lan-
guages like C, they are out of spec and hence their
behavior can vary from one system to another. While on
Linux x86 systems, an attempted division by zero gener-
ates a SIGFPE signal, this is not necessarily the case for
ARM Linux. Most ARM processors do not implement the
UDIV and SDIV instructions intended for integer division,
emulating these in software instead. On such processors,
trying to divide by zero with the UDIV instruction would
not result in a SIGFPE, but rather in a SIGILL, as the
instruction is not even recognized. On other ARM systems
(or architectures such as MIPS), no fault or signal is even
generated, and the division by zero simply returns a zero.
4.2.3. Segmentation Faults. A segmentation fault occurs
when upon an invalid memory access. The access might
be invalid because the address does not refer to mapped
memory at all, such as a NULL pointer dereference; or
because the process lacks the permissions required for the
specific access, such as writing to read-only memory, or
trying to execute kernel code. On Linux, a segmentation
fault results in a SIGSEGV signal.
We can intentionally generate segmentation faults by
inserting instructions that makes invalid memory accesses.
The layout of the address space is not very predictable,
however. It contains two fixed areas that we can choose
addresses from: the NULL page, and kernel space. Even
if the kernel is running with Kernel Page Table Isolation
(to protect against Meltdown attacks), accessing locations
in the then unmapped kernel memory still results in a
SIGSEGV. The kernel’s exact address range varies be-
tween architectures, and some pages are explicitly mapped
to be accessible from user space such as the vectors
page on ARMv7 and the vsyscall page on x86. As
their addresses are fixed, they pose no real problems.
On ARM, we have two choices for the specific faulting
instructions: load/store instructions and indirect control-
flow instructions. At the moment of the attempted memory
access or control transfer, their base register and target
address register contain the kernel-space address, which
can be computed in an obfuscated manner to make it less
conspicuous. Many more options to generate segmenta-
tion faults exist, and the options for which the specific
fault address can easily encode information include the
following: writing to the binary’s read-only data segment,
branching to the binary’s data segment, branching to the
stack, etc. On x86, equivalent instructions exist that can
be used to trigger segmentation faults.
4.2.4. Unaligned Memory Accesses. Even if an instruc-
tion accesses a valid address, it can still fault when the
address is not alignment. Some ARM processors do not
allow any unaligned memory access. Some only disallow
it for certain instructions. Similarly, some x86 instructions
also require a specific alignment. In those cases, unaligned
memory accesses are regarded as a software fault, and on
Linux result in a SIGBUS signal.
As the instructions that can trigger a SIGBUS vary
across ARM processors, there is a clear portability issue.
We can sidestep this issue by only inserting instructions
for which unaligned memory accesses are illegal on every
ARM processor, such as LDREX, but that is not stealthy
at all. Moreover, a more problematic portability issue is
that the Linux kernel on ARM is often configured to
hide unaligned memory accesses from user processes. In
that case, the kernel handles unaligned memory accesses
without even sending a SIGBUS signal.
4.2.5. Actual Implementation. From our investigation
we concluded that triggering segmentation faults is the
TABLE 1. OVERHEAD OF INDIVIDUAL SELF-DEBUGGING ASPECTS
Aspect Execution Time
Initialization 16 ms
Memory Read 4.4 µs
Memory Write 4.8 µs
Switch SIGTRAP 7.9 ms
Switch SIGSEGV (RW) 0.065 ms
Switch SIGSEGV (X) 0.060 ms
most platform-independent signaling method. It can be
made to work on all ARM devices, and it is also portable
to x86 platforms. In general, we suspect significantly less
portability concerns on the x86 platform. The two signal-
ing methods we implemented in our prototype reflect our
conclusions. Both methods use segmentation faults: one
uses loads and stores, the other uses indirect branches.
4.3. Switch Verification
Upon invocation, the mini-debugger has to determine
whether it is dealing with an actual invocation or a genuine
signal caused by original application behavior. We there-
fore use a whitelist. For all switches, coming both pro-
tected application as self-debugger, this whitelist contains
the addresses of all potential faulting instructions. The
addresses in this whitelist should of course be obfuscated.
Upon invocation, the mini-debugger verifies the faulting
instruction is whitelist. If not, the signal is passed on to
the exception-throwing process.
5. Evaluation
We evaluated and tested our technique on an Arndale
ARMv7 Board that runs Ubuntu 15.04, featuring Linux
4.3.0. In our tool chain, we used GCC 4.8.1 and GNU
binutils 2.23, the latest versions for which we have the
necessary patches to support our binary rewriter. From
version 4.4 onwards, Android features Linux kernels re-
cent enough for our improved mini-debugger, but we lack
a patched Android compiler tool chain for such recent
versions. We therefore did not evaluate our technique on
Android. The lack of recent patches is an engineering
issue that results from a lack of resources to port and
maintain patches forward, not a fundamental issue. All
patches are available online, and all our prototype source
code will be released upon publication of this paper.
5.1. Performance Overhead
It is rather meaningless to present a concrete per-
formance overhead for an application protected by our
improved self-debugging technique. When protecting their
application, developers choose which code fragments to
migrate to the self-debugger in function of the specific,
sensitive code they want to protect. To thwart attackers,
they should ensure plenty of control flow switches occur
in or near the sensitive code. The overhead for a specific
application depends by and large on the fragments being
migrated and on which code paths these fragments lie.
Profiling can be used to select code fragments that are not
too hot, nor too cold, but the exact performance overhead
is context-dependent. On top of that, we can transform hot
TABLE 2. RESULTS FROM BINARY NINJA ANALYSIS
# Code Migrated Targets Non-migrated Targets Faulting Instructions
Fragments Disassembled Total Disassembled Total Value Found Total
3 2 3 1 5 3 9
5 2 5 4 7 5 14
7 2 7 6 9 4 19
10 2 10 4 12 7 25
13 3 13 8 15 6 32
15 4 15 10 17 10 36
code to create colder code that is more suitable to being
migrated, through loop tiling for example.
Still, we can measure the impact of several operations,
such as its initialization, memory operations performed
from a migrated code fragment, and switches to and
from such a fragment. To that extent, we used micro-
benchmarks that were completely dominated by the as-
pect to measure, compiled these benchmarks at -O2 and
employed perf. Our results can be seen in Table 1.
We measured the execution time for: the self-debugging
initialization routine; memory reads or writes from the
self-debugger, using the mini-debugger’s memory support;
and control flow switches, using the different signaling
methods we implemented. The memory reads and writes
correspond to a single LDR or STR instruction. Two
switches occur when executing a migrated code fragment
in the self-debugger: one switch to the self-debugger, and
one switch back the application.
We measured the SIGTRAP signaling method em-
ployed in our previous implementation as a reference,
and came to the conclusion that it is two orders of
magnitude slower as the stealthier signaling methods we
implemented. The reason for this is that the specific Linux
kernel code path triggered by a BKPT instruction performs
some I/O, slowing it down [27].
5.2. Security Evaluation
We evaluate how our improved design thwarts several
approaches an attacker could take to defeat our original
design, and conclude this section by considering the attack
approaches that remain, as well as the orthogonal defenses
that can improve the resilience of our technique.
In our original design, an attacker could attach their
own debugger to the self-debugger. In our improved de-
sign, such a debugger can no longer attach to either the
self-debugger or the protected application. We verified this
in real life, but also investigated an alternative attack that,
with some extra work, still allows an attacker to attach
a hostile debugger to either process, although only tem-
porarily. We explain this attack with the example goal of
attaching to the protected application. To achieve this goal,
the attacker needs to simultaneously terminate the self-
debugger through a SIGKILL, and pause the protected
application through a SIGSTOP. The latter signal is nec-
essary to prevent the protected application from continuing
its execution, encountering a mini-debugger invocation
masquerading as a software fault, and dying. The attacker
can subsequently attach their debugger to the application,
continue it, and analyze or tamper with its execution until
it encounters the next software fault. To perform this
attack the PTRACE_O_EXITKILL option first has to be
disabled, however. If it were not, the SIGKILL signal
would result in the death of both processes.
After tampering with the binary to disable
PTRACE_O_EXITKILL, an attacker can thus temporarily
attach to either process and observe or tamper with the
execution of application code (migrated or otherwise).
To stay attached more permanently, however, the attacker
has to reverse the transformations our technique employs
to migrate code and invoke the mini-debugger. In
our previous design, such invocations could easily
be recognized statically through their use of BKPT
instructions. In our improved design, this is no longer
the case as we reuse application code to trigger software
faults. If an attacker were to invest extra time and effort,
a more advanced static analysis might be able to find the
faulting instructions, however.
To evaluate how easy it was to find faulting instruc-
tions statically, we set up an experiment using the open-
source compression tool bzip2, compiled at -Os. We
successively migrated more code fragments to the self-
debugger, and analyzed the resulting binary using Binary
Ninja [28]. The reason we use Binary Ninja as opposed to
other disassemblers (such as IDA Pro) is that it contains
more advanced—and for this experiment, more relevant—
features such as value-set analysis (VSA). Table 2 contains
the results of Binary Ninja’s analysis. The only protec-
tion we applied to bzip2 was our own self-debugging
technique; we did not use any obfuscations. Even then,
VSA found the faulting address as a possible value for
only roughly a third of all faulting instructions. Binary
Ninja does not explicitly flag these values as causing
software faults, but an attacker could write an analysis
to do so. On top of that, Binary Ninja’s recursive descent
no longer disassembles all the targets of control transfers,
regarding them as data instead. The control transfers from
the mini-debugger to these targets happen through a com-
plex indirection, and can not be followed. Some targets
have more direct incoming control flow that causes them
to be disassembled, however, or are recognized as code
without incoming control flow by heuristics. Our stealthier
interfaces are thus rather effective in hiding mini-debugger
invocations, but could be even more effective if augmented
with more advanced data obfuscations.
If attackers cannot locate and reverse our transforma-
tions statically, they have to do so dynamically. Our tech-
nique’s entire purpose is to hinder dynamic analysis using
debuggers, however. Reversing our transformations one
software fault at a time would come at a considerable cost.
Our technique can be made even stronger by applying or-
thogonal defenses such as (data) obfuscations and integrity
checks, particularly on the initialization routine where the
PTRACE_O_EXITKILL option is enabled. Other, less
convenient, potential approaches still left open to an attack
are emulation, which we consider out of scope; and some
sort of emulation/interposing of the ptrace API, which
would again require considerable effort.
6. Conclusions
We improved the state-of-the-art anti-debugging tech-
nique of self-debugging by introducing reciprocal debug-
ging and by making the interfaces to the self-debugger
stealthier. The goal of these improvements was to make
it harder for attackers to defeat the protection. Our evalu-
ation confirms that this goal was reached.
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